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“Manifestations and roles of transmedia in Japan Society and the 
construction of its image overseas: Fictionality in the Era of convergence” 
 
 
Dr Manuel Hernandez-Perez 




1. Fictionality, producers and consumers in the paradigm of Convergence  
 
The term ‘Culture of Convergence’ (Jenkins, 2006) is still one of the most influential 
characterizations of Cultural Studies and Communication Studies nowadays. As it has 
been commented through this volume, the concept defines a global phenomenon that 
includes other technological, sociological and communicative aspects. Among other 
consequences, Jenkins points to the discursive fragmentation, a global trend towards 
content-recycling, and the participation of active (digital) audiences (ibid.).  While 
certainly implicit, others have preferred to emphasise this sociological aspect of the 
audiences’ empowerment. 'Digital storytelling', for example, would be the product of 
an audience that not only can but feels the need of telling more through their own 
stories (Couldry, 2008). These two aspects of transmedia communication, the 
multiplication of formats and products, and the multiplication of increasingly 
individual and subjective voices, have aroused interest in the theorizing of the fictional 
aspects of transmedia. Fictionality can be considered a transmedia feature through the 
definition of representational shared and persistent values of their concepts (Zipfel, 
2014). But, while 'Storytelling' etymologically address to the narrative features of the 
communication but, as this project is intended to show, Transmedia is not necessarily 
linked to fictional narrations.  
 
However, the transmedia phenomenon can be studied from narrative theory. In the 
field of journalism, for example, it is common  to find the distinction between cross-
media (which many understand as multiplatform adaptation) and transmedia (a 
scattered narrative) (Veglis, 2012). While it is clear that we do not refer to genres or 
fictional contexts (journalism at least tries to tell the truth), there should be still room 
for the introduction of fictional elements. Thus, Fictionality can be understood as 
either a quality or a mode (fictive discourse) to which we have access through 
cognition. Audiences know that a text or part of a text is not real but this is accepted 
as a way of establishing an argument or as a pleasure. In this model of rhetorical and 
cognitive inspiration, fictionality has been described as a universal quality, defined as 
‘intentional use of invented stories and scenarios’ (Nielsen et al., 2015). However, if a 
fictional model serves the purpose of a transmedia narrative, this one needs to be 
understood through a communication scheme. As has been suggested, fictionality 
“resides in a way of using a language, and its distinctiveness consists in the 
recognisably distinct rhetorical set invoked by that use” (Walsh, 2007).   
 
Here a reasonable doubt arises because, as any theory of communication explains, 
there can be a difference between what is intentional and what is finally recognised. 
There is, therefore, the need to discern whether they are both treated as necessary. Can 
it be considered fictional those narratives that audiences take by non-fictional? 
Imagine the extreme case of mock-documentaries. Perhaps, if the definition of ‘genre’ 
depends on the dialogue with the audience, a definition of fictionality based on the 
genre can be inclusive, creating products that are both fictional and non-fictional at 
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the same time. On the other hand, the requirement of intentionality closes the 
possibility that narrative is an involuntary act, naturally associated with cognition. 
However, there is evidence that would support this thesis. Finally, there are also 
certain formal implications associated with text derived from this distinction between 
the 'sign' and the 'recognisable' that can help revive the issue of the fictional genre. 
That is, fictional texts should be recognisable by their form and content.  
 
Institutional communication and its dialogue with the media are a good example of 
how fictionality cant be isolateds from transmedia communication. This hybridization 
is even more tangible in those contexts where Popular Culture plays a more relevant 
role. This can be explained in different ways. It is possible that the most active media 
users are young people and that Popular Culture is a substantial part of their 
consumption and production. On the other hand, the most consumed and shared 
transmedia stories in the world belong to fictional narratives, with a high prevalence 
of fantasy worlds and science fiction. It is the fictional stories that inspire greater 
participation and contribute to the creation of texts in specialized (fandom) and 
general communities. 
 
It is my goal in this work to link with narrative theory as the main axis for a 
communicational and rhetorical study for what I choose Japanese Institutional 
Communication as a main example. First, I will explore the main Japanese 
communication agents and the current state of the convergence process, taking into 
account technological and sociological aspects. Secondly, will summarise from a 
historical perspective, the main elements of the media industries in relation to the 
fictionality and their convergence with media ecosystems and institutional 
communication.  Finally, I will examine these issues through a relevant case study: the 
reformulations of national Branding aligned to the Cool Japan (Tokyo 2020 Olympic 
Games). While it is more a prior exploration than a refutable research, I will maintain 
a weak version of my hypothesis: that it is almost impossible to build messages that do 
not replicate or reference elements from other communication structures including 
fictional narratives.  
 
 
2. Japanese Media Ecosystem 
 
Following the global trend, there have been attempts by the Japanese government 
since the beginning of the century to foster technological convergence and stimulate 
creative industries. In the case of Japan, the rapid onset of new technologies 
(particularly the internet and mobile technologies) is the result of an 'interventionist' 
policy and has been defined in terms of ‘integration’ and ‘digitalization’ (Menon, 
2006). The term integration refers to how the media can share the same technology 
infrastructure. For example, mobile, internet and television can now be offered by the 
same provider through high-speed internet connections. On the other hand, the 
digitalization is more oriented to the treatment of contents, and its transformation into 
digital formats. Political and historical factors have contributed to a map of platforms 
and transmedia agents, although in a different way from other countries with the equal 
level of development: 
 





Despite the progress of social media and internet, 51% of Japanese still go to television 
on a daily basis to get informed, a situation that may change in a very close future 
(Reuters Institute, 2016b).  
  
In relation to the consumption of entertainment products, the main media are 
YouTube and Japanese distributor NicoNico Video. Video streaming has been over the 
years much more popular for both the consumption of news and the consumption of 
entertainment products. Of great importance are the multi-platform tools of media 
groups (Newspapers) such as NHK or Tokyo TV. Actually, reports indicate that 
watching the news on the online site (39%) is more frequent than trough Social 
Networks (15%) (Reuters Institute, 2016b). In October 2014, the merging of Kadokawa 
with Dwango, founder of NicoNico, was completed. Everything points to a shift 
towards the convergence of multimedia platforms, due to the relevance of Kadokawa, 
largest Publisher in Japan, as a content generator. NicoNico's video interfaces are 
radically different from other multimedia content providers because they include 
comments and cross-platforms links (Steinberg, IN PRESS/DRAFT).  
 
Publishers, Newspapers and Content Aggregators 
 
In the Japanese case, the regional press (21%) is used more frequently weekly as a 
news source, followed by nationals Yomiuri Shimbun (16%), Asashi Shimbun (14%) 
and lower level Mainichi Shimbun (5% ) And Sankei Shimbun (4%) (Reuters Institute, 
2016a). The interest in the local press may be linked to the interest of the Japanese in 
political participation. The population has been re-politicized at the local level in 
response to the disapproval of national policy, accommodating to institutional 
decentralisation (Foljanty-Jost and Schmidt, 2006).  This citizen participation can 
find in the social media a form of expression if not completely free at least not directly 
controlled by the government. In that sense, the freedom of the press in Japan has 
been questioned, due to the powerful influence of the media conglomerates. An 
example may be the kisha clubs (lit. 'reporters' club), which are associations that have 
exclusive access in the form of monopoly to numerous institutional sources. This 
eventually contributes to the homogeneity of news content and its ease of 
manipulation (Au and Kawai, 2012). 
 
The survival and prevalence of news aggregators like Yahoo News or BuzzFeed Japan 
are justified by the confidence generated in the quality and ideology of these portals 
(Reuters Institute, 2016b). This, in the long term, is detrimental to the emergence of a 
competent digital native press. Compared to other countries, aggregation behaviour is 
a common and successful practice, similar in its frequency to other countries such as 
Korea or the Czech Republic. There is a big market in the news and many native digital 
platforms (along with other social applications like LINE or Mixi) have already take 
positions. 
 
Interestingly, the Japanese are more interested in "soft" news that in the reports 
including entertainment and celebrities, lifestyle news, Arts and Culture and sports. 
Audiences most interested in these topics are mainly women (44%) and sectors 
between 18 and 24 years old (58% ) (Reuters Institute, 2016b). Consistent with other 
commented data, the news consumer profile is mainly passive: just 40% acknowledge 






Mobile and Social Media  
 
The government's commitment to technology is especially interested in the 
democratisation of the Internet environment. For example, in December 2016, The 
Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry announced the installation of 30,000 
Wi-Fi Access Point prior to the Olympic events. This strong investment, which involves 
doubling the number of free accesses available in 2016 (Kikuchi, 2016), aims to give 
free and immediate access to the Internet to victims of natural disasters. Although the 
announcement can be considered a beneficial investment for the tourism industry, the 
measure is local and it is not clear what the impact in the city of Tokyo could be. Urban 
population employ individual 3G / 4G access, usually through monthly based 
contracts with the communications providers. 
 
In recent years, so-called digital media have gradually replaced mass media in many 
respects (interest, use, scope ... etc.). In Japan, where the population pyramid has been 
clearly inverted for decades, the bulk of internet users is over 35, the same early 
adopters of mobile email some years ago (Boase and Kobayashi, 2008). Despite the 
common image of Japan as a technology heaven and mediatized society, in many 
respects, the Japanese are less active in Social Networks than their Asian neighbours 
are. According to data from March 2015, (RVC, 2016)  Japan is the fourth country in 
the Asian zone in terms of National Internet penetration with an index of 86% and the 
third position (84%) in unique mobile users. However, the Japanese recognise 
spending less than 20 minutes a day in social media, a very low figure compared to 
Malaysians, Thais and Indonesian users, for example, who spend about two hours. In 
terms of Mobile Social Use, Japan stands at 17%, which is below the average (22%) of 
the continent. The use of the mobile for purchases or m-commerce is low, being 
inferior to many countries of another continent in a list led by Asian countries like SK, 
China, HK, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. As a counterpart, it seems that, from 
2015, mobile and tablets are increasingly used for the consultation of News (Reuters 
Institute, 2016b).  In relation to social media activities consumption, there are also 
slight differences with users from other countries. For example, when the most 
habitual behaviours are usually watch videos, read/like to post and check other's 
profile, it seems that the actions of the Japanese users tend to be more anonymous, 
being lower the behaviours such as "like a post" and "Checking profiles". The relatively 
low index of streaming video consumption through social media can be explained by 
the already mentioned abundance of alternatives offered by traditional platforms 
through their official sites.  
 
The literature on Japanese media suggests that in the case of digital media, it is also 
possible to speak of a certain idiosyncrasy. Thus, the form, function and history of the 
creation of virtual communities in the Japanese context are different from that of other 
countries, including Western but also Asian ones. According to data from the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015), the most used tools by Japanese 
consumers are Facebook (35.3%), LINE (32.5%), Twitter (31%), Mixi (16.5%) and 
Instagram)1. However, due to the similarity and consistency among digital platforms 
and the multiple overlapping in their use, it is necessary to consider the use and the 
meaning of this consumption above the preference for a particular brand.  
 
1 These data of institutional origin may differ from other external sources depending on the criteria 
followed in the correspondent survey. For example, compared to Reuters Institute (2016) the MIC does 




Supposedly, Mixi (https://mixi.jp/) is a social network more exclusive than Facebook 
since it is proposed to put in contact only people with similar hobbies and interests. In 
that sense, it is a platform more oriented to the creation of communities and makes 
new friends. As it happens on Facebook, there is an implicit connection with other 
social networks by allowing the search of old schoolmates from High School or college. 
As the main difference with other social networks, Mixi limits to 1000 the number of 
contacts, a norm that can only skip celebrities’ profiles. Until 2010, the access to the 
web was possible only by invitation. Subsequently, it became necessary to verify by 
mobile phone, a mechanism that limits the use of the platform to Japanese users or 
people already settled down in Japan. In that sense, the average profile of users up to 
2015 was 44.6% between 15-24, also inhabitants of the populated Kanto area (Tokyo, 
Yokohama and surroundings)2. Anonymity and concern for privacy are part of the 
nature of the network since its inception. During the first years, the platform used 
people and many users adopted false profiles, supplanting celebrities. Fictional 
characters as manga and anime characters, updated their profile, followed by 
thousands of users. In 2011, Mixi Page was established, a strategy similar to the 
separation that Facebook makes between personal profiles and professional pages. 
Also, Mixi was one of the first applications to use the footprint (ashiato) which lets you 
know who has visited your profile, when and how many times. As a virtual community, 
Mixi incorporates a review function of cultural products such as music CDs or movies, 
similarly to other databases with social functions such as IMDB 
(https://www.imdb.com ). The web also serves as a showcase for news and trending 
topics within the community.  
 
Mixi’s monopoly, hegemonic until 2008, began to be replaced by other applications 
such as Twitter, LINE and Facebook. Many consider that the success of Twitter in 
Japan is due to the coverage offered by their anonymous identity. That would be 
consistent with the popularity of Mixi and the almost 21% of users adopting 
anonymous profiles in Facebook (RVC, 2016).  Other technical features may also 
justify their popularity. The incorporation of Internet to the mobile devices was 
popular in Japan before it was in other countries, as the Japanese version of Twitter 
was released in 2008. Asian languages like Japanese or Chinese take more advantage 
of the software's 140-character limitation. In Japanese alphabets (hiragana and 
katakana), with a syllabic basis, one character occupies half that of a Western 
language such as Spanish or English. Even less if ideograms such as those derived from 
Chinese (kanji) are used which can carry complete units of meaning (verbs, objects ...) 
in each symbol. 
 
Taken as a whole, the increase in the participation of different social networks has 
grown steadily in recent years. The majority of the investigations indicate as a point of 
inflexion the Great earthquake of March of 2011 (Ikeda and Richey, 2012), and 
understand that this may be only the beginning of greater mobilisation and political 
activism. However, it does not look as the degree and motivations behind participation 
in social networks offer the necessary conditions for activism yet. Most important 
virtual forums in Japan, such as Ni-Channeru, are more focused on gathering and 
creating communities around fictional worlds. This orientation to escapism and 
fictionality could be a characteristic feature of Japanese virtual communities. A 
comparative study conducted with South Korean audiences (Ishii and Ogasahara, 
 
2 There are no more official company announcements since it stopped updating their public statistics 
since April 2013, http://mixi.co.jp/profile/think/data/.  
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2007), suggests that in contrast, Japanese virtual communities are not as strongly 
related to the real group as the Korean ones, ie they are formed primarily in the 
network. In more recent data (Reuters Institute, 2016b), the percentage of citizens that 
came to the SN as a primary source of news reached 7%, still considerably low 
compared to other Western countries but significantly higher than 3% in 2015. The 
Japanese usually come to YouTube (26%), Facebook (16% %), Twitter (16%) and LINE 
(13%). Put it in short, it looks that in the convergence area main sources of leisure and 
fictional products are also the main tools of communications but, why is Japan an 
illustrative example of this convergence? 
 
 
3. Japanese Transmedialities 
 
 
Japanese popular culture can be considered one of the main aportations to the global 
imagery and through its different visual styles (manga, kawaii, chibi..) and narrative 
tropes has let significant influence in all transnational media industries. The most 
appropriate model to characterise the Japanese industries goes through the 
characterization of this phenomenon as a reticular architecture, traditionally 
centralised around manga medium (Hernández-Pérez, 2017). This should emphasise 
the need to move from seriality - whether of retroactive or proactive origin - to the 
cross-platform design. Centrality and reference, terminologies derived from cognitive 
science, are the main forms in which this model of cross-media narrative must be 
defined (ibid.). In these franchises can be identified to text/set of texts to which all 
other elements refer, that is, that shows to hypo-textuality with respect to the rest of 
texts (Genette, 1989). This central text or parental is usually the first published manga, 
although there are exceptions originated in video games, light novel or anime. Japan 
has been the subject of a number of studies about the particularities of its popular 
industries Transmedia model(s)  in which adaptations within manga, anime and toys 
are the basic mechanism of content recycling strategies, also called media-mix. 
 
The term ‘media mix’ in relation to the Japanese entertainment industry is officially 
introduced in an interview by Yoshio Irie, editor-in-chief of Nakayoshi magazine 
(Schodt, 1996). The magazine, published since 1954 by Kodansha, was aimed at a 
teenage female audience, offering the usual serial stories. It also offered articles and 
educational illustrations as a complement to these other ludic contents. Shortly after, 
due to the manga boom in Japan, a new market rise supplying the corresponding 
series manga (between 12 and 15), emphasising among its habitual collaborators to 
Osamu Tezuka (Princess Knight, 1958) and Yumiko Ligarashi (Candy Candy, 1975-
79). In 1990 with the addition of Irie to the head of the publishing house, the magazine 
adopts as a priority the creation of stories for television scheduled to be released 
shortly after the corresponding manga. The goal, shared by many projects since then 
was to reach the realisation of the merchandising based on the characters as soon as 
possible, which would generate real benefits. In fact, this model of industry and its 
close relationship with the anime begins to implant in the beginnings of the Japanese 
animation, being Tetsuwan Atomu (1963), first anime and also the first character in 
creating a merchandising industry around him (Steinberg, 2012).  
 
The phenomenon of the characters has moved to institutional communication, causing 
an oversaturation of characters in institutions, companies, educational programs ... 
This is also the case of Yuru Kyara, PR agents in the form of mascots and Gotochi 
Kyara, Ambassadors of a city or region (Occhi, 2014). The most striking thing about 
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the Kyara and its industries is that they are characters without history or narrative, at 
least in the classical sense. All of them, however, possess the potential to engage 
audiences emotionally and therefore are able to generate an infinity of narratives. See, 
for example, the twitter account of Kumamon, one of the most celebrated characters, 
representative of the Kumamoto area. The character reports about his activities as an 
ambassador almost daily through his personal twitter account (@ 55_kumamon). 
Through his images and comments reports about his visits to schools, museums and 
other institutions. Their job is promoting selling, for example, local agricultural 
commodities (oranges, strawberries). However, Kumamon's work can take him very 
far. At the end of November 2016, the popular mascot visited the French cities of Paris 
and Bordeaux. Kumamon also has other friends, other kyara that he visits in official 
acts of their corresponding prefectures and localities. In February 2017, posted a pic 
with Ganba-kun and Ranba-chan, in Nagasaki, in December of the previous year he 
had visited Musubimaru, the mascot of the Miyagi Government Office. Kumamon's 
tweets are similar to those of a celebrity. Also on Facebook 
(https://www.facebook.com/kumamonofficial ) and Instagram (kumako_kumamon), 
where he welcomes every new week ("I'll work very hard this week") or wish a good 
evening to their Followers ("Good night (Oyakuma) ☆"). Through Kyara, Japanese 
institutional communication demonstrates how fictional and narrative are 
intermingled in genres and communication frames that were not expected to be 
fictional, but in which seems to be totally addressed to entertainment now. 
 
Following the model of other media-mix industries, LINE business is sustained in the 
creation of characters with potential for transmedia expansion. LINE is an instant 
messaging / chat tool similar to WhatsApp more used in Western countries. It is quite 
popular in the youth sector for its strong visual identity, reinforced through their 
different functionalities. These function as sophisticated emoticons and occasionally 
use characters from anime franchises and other Western cartoons. Paid games are also 
quite popular. These are usually arcade or casual mini-games and can be played 
individually or competitively. Advertising is a great source of income, due to the 
penetration of the tool in the area. Finally, and as an innovative feature in this sector, 
LINE brands its own merchandise which generates also income in products such as t-
shirts, toys, etc. 
 
As part of its narrative expansion, LINE includes a whole family of characters: Brown, 
the bear is the main protagonist of the narrative along with Cony, a white rabbit. The 
pair is used symbolically in the emoticons to represent the relationships of the couple, 
sometimes, in an exclusively romantic way, since Brown is male and Cony female. 
Sally, it is an inexpressive (also silent) naïf design of a yellow chick, although it really 
looks like a duck. The character of James is especially comical. It works like a 
simplified version of a bishōnen design. A popular figure among manga and Japanese 
anime, bishōnen refers to a young boy with female-like physical features. Depending 
on the manga genre and the kind of story, these boys can be also depicted as skilled 
athletes or warriors which have been considered as a challenge to effeminate 
characters from other traditions in popular culture. Most of the emoticons featuring 
James replicate elements of this subgenre manga visual style in which he appears as 
a character presumed and extroverted, very emotionally expressive (in that sense very 
similar to Cony). Moon is the symbolic representation of a ‘salaryman’ (Sararyman), 
an archetype deeply rooted in Japanese popular culture from the pre-crisis Japanese 
economic bubble. To serve this purpose as an archetype, Moon has an iconic, hairless, 
round and white face. His supervisor (‘Boss’) is his partner in some emoticons 
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(stickers) that synthesise scenes of this narrative. Jessica is Cony's best friend and 
shows a great inclination for domestic work. The narratives of other characters are less 
developed in the application and include Edward (Caterpillar), Leonard (frog), Choco 
(Brown's little sister), and Pangyo (a panda bear, presumably her boyfriend who very 
significantly has a Korean name). In April 2013, Tokyo TV channel 5 released an 
animated series called 'Line Town'. The series was previously tested as a pilot in the 
episode emitted by Tokyo TV "Line Offline: Salaryman" of only 5 minutes of duration. 
Finally, there is an official shop called 'Line Friends' that can be found in the Harajuko 
town (Tokyo prefecture) with branches in other countries like Korea and Taiwan.   
 
A distinctive graphic design is one of the pillars in the tradition of Kyara business such 
as Sanrio’s Hello Kitty. This can be understood as the other great cultural contribution 
of this business model. The term kawaii (‘cute’) refers to one of the main features of 
Japanese popular design. However, despite the relevance of kawaii style in the history 
of the Japanese visual arts, it is an accepted fact that 'cute' designs are not exclusive to 
Japanese industries. Other Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, China... are 
major consumers of kawaii culture and with the time, they have made their own 
adaptations. Global aspirations of this trend explain LINE’s success in the SE Asian 
area. Kawaii consumers of LINE may feel identified with the transnational manga and 
anime audiences, naturally aligned in the demographic market of the app, both 
through age and location. In addition, it is evident that there is an emotional 
component that underlies the sophisticated design of the LINE sticker in comparison 
with traditional emoticons. The stickers, considerably larger in size, express a greater 
range and detail in the emotions. On the other hand, the design of the scenes could 
follow a narrative logic in different ways. For example, they could be an adaptation to 
panel format of a narrative created in other media forms such as the anime. One could 
even speak of a reticular narrative in which the episodes or events are disordered (ie 
Connie and Brown marry, the couple starts living together ...). It is difficult to verify 
either of the two hypotheses, even more, when the catalogue of stickers is different 
according to the national market. Many of these, simple adaptations to gestures and 
expressions typical of the country (ie, Moon hand gestures in the Italian LINE app).  
 
What is clear through the cases of LINE, Mixi and other social networks in Japan is 
that interpersonal communication may present significant differences among 
international audiences. In the case of Japan, escapism through consume of fictional 
products and anonymity may be more than a common trend.  
 
4. Case Study: Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games 
 
The overwhelming presence of Japanese content, especially in the field of animation 
and video games, to some extent redefines the image of the Japanese culture from the 
West. In the case of the West, this perception is differentiated at the generational level. 
Twenty years ago, Japan was seen as a threatening power whose main weapon, being 
a country without natural resources, was its relentless methodology (kaizen). As we 
know, the subsequent explosion of the Japanese economic bubble dragged the country 
into a long recession of which it has not yet recovered. But in the midst of that 
economic "nightmare" - or rather, "awakening" from a dream - Japan seems to have 
found comfort in projecting an image of cultural hegemony with which he can come 
back to his old aspirations of leading Asia. Iwabuchi (2010) calls this strategy 'Brand 
Nationalism', rescuing in a certain way the imperialist past of Japan. It has also been 
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employed frequently the concept of "soft power", which addresses John Nye's work, 
an American thinker who analysed power relations, after the fall of Berlin’s wall. In 
those moments of special uncertainty, the United States had to find a new way of 
achieving its interests without resorting to coercion. As an alternative to military 
power, this "soft power" proposes awakening in others the desire to be imitated (Nye, 
1990). Therefore, popular culture from Hollywood's cinema to McDonalds's 
gastronomic empire was supposed to play an important role, not so much because of 
its real influence but because of its scope, and because, at first sight, its "soft" features 
would allow greater permeability. First used in 2002 in relation to Japanese culture, 
the term ‘Gross National Cool’ indicates the intentional nature of this projection that 
is based on the main resource that is left to the Japanese economy and is none other 
than "its enormous Cultural capital " (McGray, 2002).  
  
Regardless of the labels chosen, it is certain that Japan is aware of the projected image 
overseas through its omnipresent Popular Culture. On September 7, 2013, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the 2020 Games to Tokyo. The 
implications of this historic opportunity are of great importance to all economic 
sectors in Japan. It is also for its international image, damaged by the other great event 
of the decade, the unfortunate incident caused by the Great Earthquake and the 
security breach in Fukushima. 
 
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe had to answer questions about safety in his pitch for the 
concession of the games, promising security as the main objective. Years later and with 
the closeness of the event, the international press sees the event with scepticism. 
Junichiro Koizumi former prime minister accuses Abe of lying to the government's 
ability to maintain adequate levels of nuclear security (Shino and Reuters, 2016). 
Scandals follow in relation to various aspects of the games organization: Investigations 
for bribery in the concession of the games (Gibson, 2016), doubts of security against 
cyberattacks (McCurry, 2016), The resignation of the governor of Tokyo due to 
expenses of the public treasury (Yoshida, 2016) And even change in the Tokyo 2020 
logo due to accusations of plagiarism (Addley, 2016).   
 
But Social Media, in its anarchy, lies far from agenda and journalism themes. 
Audiences around the world, particularly the Japanese, focus their attention to the 
closing ceremony of Rio 2016. During the show, Shinzō Abe prime minister made 
appearance in a failed cosplay of Super Mario. His performance linked with the 
projection of a video that included the expected inspirational images of Olympic 
athletes accompanied by some of the main contributions of Japan to the collective 
imagination: Pac-Man, Hello Kitty, Doraemon and Captain Tsubasa. Facing the 
impossibility of arriving in time, Abe, one more of the protagonists of this fiction, is 
transformed into the well-known video game character. Helped by Doraemon, he finds 
one of the iconic transdimensional pipelines that will make it possible for him to reach 
Tokyo from his awaited appointment in Rio on time.  
 
Abe's cosplay can only mean a new turn to soft power which connects with other 
actions from the past which linked to political influence through the appeal of 
Japanese creative industries (Pellitteri, (IN PRESS)). Actually, the promotion of Japan 
through a content industries macro-strategy has some history in the Japanese political 
agenda. The Japanese government has for years promulgated policies that would 
improve the sale of its products and develop the "Japan" brand strategy, a direction it 
has taken since 1986 when Prime Minister Nakasone promoted the 
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"internationalisation" (kokusaika) of the country (Daliot-Bul, 2009). Interest in 
promoting the media arts coincides with a delicate moment in Japan's economic 
history that has stalled in a recession since the early 1990s. With the arrival of former 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001, started to be clear that the country should 
"coordinate the appropriate measures for the production, viewing and other aspects of 
these arts". From that moment, Media Arts, including manga and videogames 
animation among other artistic disciplines starts to be officially promoted, good way 
to "attract the international attention, what repercusses in greater interest and 
understanding by Japan". But above all, it is considered the "role that popular culture 
can play in the promotion of industry and tourism, as well as cultural exchange" 
(Agency for Cultural Affairs, 2003).  In 2004, the first Strategic Intellectual Property 
Program (IPSP) was created, with the purpose of "making Japan a world leader in 
content"(IPSP, 2006). Following this trend, the Commissioner for Cultural Affairs, 
Seiichi Kōndo has repeatedly referred to the concept of Cool Japan and the role that 
culture must play in international politics. However, for Kōndo, entertainment-
oriented policy projects an incomplete picture, and while recognising its utility in 
attracting international attention, it prefers to focus on a more traditional and holistic 
view of Japanese culture, relative to that of other countries Of the Asian sphere 
(Kōndo, 2011).  
 
The Japanese Council of Cultural Affairs then took very noticeable decisions at 
international level, which included the appointment of various characters such as 
Astroboy, Doraemon and Hello Kitty as "Ambassadors", symbolising, thus, the 
valuation of such relevant cultural products. The main promoter of these events was 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who for the first time used the term "power" to refer to the 
popularity of Japanese characters in Asian markets (Aso, 2006). The figure of Taro 
Aso is in certain aspects controversial and symbolises the controversial reactions that 
awaken Popular Culture industries in its country of origin. Taro Aso has been named 
Prime Minister after the resignation of Yasuo Fukuda in September 2007. The 
politician was then known as a confessed "otaku" Which aroused some controversy in 
his appointment. Being a manga fan and having contributed to its diffusion in the 
Council of Cultural Affairs, the appointment of Aso drew the attention of the industry 
to the possible measures with which from the power would promote the media arts. 
During 2009, Aso continued with its plan to promote this sector, promising that the 
media industry would give 4 million jobs by 2020 and increase national capital by 1.2 
trillion yen. That same year embarked on a project that would be strongly criticised by 
the opposition: the construction of a gigantic manga museum in the Tokyo district of 
Akibahara. Projects and promises that he could not carry out, however, as his 
government would abruptly end his resignation a few months later, motivated by 
opposition pressure from the difficult economic situation. 
 
In 2010, METI established the Cool Japan Office and in January 2012 is published the 
Cool Japan Strategy. The plan is mainly oriented to the promotion of cultural 
industries and recognizes the importance of Asian, European and mainly North 
American markets (METI Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 2012). Although 
the potential of the Creative Industries, Fashion, Commodities and Food Culture is 
underlined, it is surprising that other less valuable export sectors such as Express 
delivery services, Japanese-Styles Inn, Traditional Arts and Crafts are also included. 
Perhaps, 'Cool Japan' does not mean the same for international audiences as for those 
responsible for Japan's National Branding. The report is complemented by a number 
of case studies in which potential international industries and benefits for tourism play 
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both an important role. During the following years, very little has been said again from 
the Japanese government about Cool Japan. It seems that Cool Japan is a narrative 
slowly diluted in the press (The Japan Times still includes a section dedicated to Cool 
Japan) and a topic of interest for academics in the social area. However, Japan’s 
identity crisis after the great East Japan earthquake may have fuelled interest in this 
question. Japan is now at a crossroads in its international agenda, its national re-
branding and its economic goals (Mandujano, 2013) which strongly links the tragedy 
of the earthquake with the need for a resurgence of Cool Japan. 
 
The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games look a logical way to boost and support these 
strategies, but also an interesting example of competing narratives across media. The 
discourses on multiculturalism and the diversity of Japan may be one of the most 
important. As has been seen, the Japanese identity and, even more, its international 
image is often considered in constant dilemma around its openness and diversity. Like 
all national images, it serves a purpose and therefore the role of national agents in the 
creation and maintenance of these stereotypes cannot be ruled out. Traditionally 
regarded as a closed country and even hostile to foreign influences, Japan has 
benefited from this image to build a halo of exoticism and uniqueness that in some 
way links with the academic discourses of the Nihonjinron (lit. Japanese Uniqueness). 
  
The biggest fortress in Tokyo in front of Madrid and Istanbul, other finalists, was 
security (Jiji, 2013) however, it is the message of openness and diversity the most 
prevalente one through the Tokyo 2020 transmedia campaign.  Mami Sato, Japanese 
Paralympian athlete finishes his intervention in the Tokyo 2020 with ensuring that 
"Excelence, Friendship and Respect can be more than words" (Olympic Channel, 
2013). Little more explicit mention was made of multiculturalism during the pitch, but 
it does not seem necessary. To take a step forward as a candidate for Olympism, is, in 
itself, a commitment to diversity. The values of the modern Olympism are based on 
the healthy sport competition between countries and the search for the improvement. 
The Olympic Games have traditionally been a 'force for change' in society for their 
ideal of tolerance of diversity and the international community acts with criticism to 
watch over these values  (Robson, 2016). In the case of Tokyo 2020, "Unity in 
Diversity" is one of three core concepts (together with "Achieving Personal Best" and 
"Connecting to Tomorrow") summarized in the vision of the games: 
 
“Accepting and respecting differences in race, colour, gender, sexual 
orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth, level of ability or other status allows peace to be 
maintained and society to continue to develop and flourish” (Internation 
Olympic Committee ICO, 2013).  
 
 
The official logo for the Tokyo 2020 Organizing Committee adapts this message to a 
graphic format, more fortunate than in its first version. With the motto "Unity in 
diversity", it is inspired by Japanese traditional patterns and colors (indigo blue) and 
it is "Composed of three varieties of rectangular shapes, the design represents different 
countries, cultures and ways of thinking" (Internation Olympic Committee ICO, 2016). 
 
We will have to wait for the next few years, to find out know in what ways Japan takes 
advantage of the multiculturalism discourses to build a national image of a culturally 
diverse and open country. On the other hand, one of the most outstanding aspects of 
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transmedia production in relation to Tokyo 2020 is related to the use of fictional 
figures. Already in the pitch speech, the industries of Japanese anime are used as one 
of the main means of promotion for the proposal. Once again, the charisma of Captain 
Tsubasa, a personage of a popular manga about the world of soccer is used, while 
explaining how he had inspired other world-class players like Messi, Kaka or 
Uchimura (Olympic Channel, 2013). The media's own expansion of cultural industries 
has already influenced the promotion of the event. Instead of the adaptation of other 
discourses or the creation of a corporate image, the multiplicity of merchandising in 
the form of commodities seems to obey more to the maximizing of benefits of 
industries based on IPSP management. Under the usual label ‘ambassadors’, so used 
in the speeches of Cool Japan, a select number of characters has been part of the 
official Tokyo2020 merchandising since February 2017. These seem to have been 
selected especially for their international popularity including Atom (Astro Boy), 
Bunny (Sailor Moon), Luffy (One Piece), Naruto, Goku (Dragon Ball Z), Shin-chan, 
and Jibanyan  (Yokai Watch). This combined with other characters appeleaing to 
Asian markets such as the magical girls from Pretty Cure.  
 
Fans also contribute to these crossover among Japanese fiction stars. The short film 
"Doraemon at the 2020 Neo-Tokyo Olympic Games" animated by Aleix Pitarch is a 
fan fiction in the form of mash-up. Released shortly after the Olympic nomination is 
known, it rescues the apocalyptic scenario of the film of Otomo Akira (1988), using the 
same shots from its theatrical version trailer including its OST. It features, as 
protagonists, Doreamon’s characters created by Fujiko F. Fujio in the late 60's. The 
show is one of the longest in the history of the Japanese media-mix having been 
recycled in numerous shows, animes and other products. Stories presents Nobita and 
his gang of friends of the school whose life changes radically with the visit of 
Doraemon, an extraterrestrial coming from the future. In each autoconlusive episode, 
Doraemon introduces a new invention with always magical characteristics in order to 
help make the daily problems of Nobita more bearable. In contrast, the Otomo film is 
part of the collective imagination by the force of its transgressive and counter-cultural 
image. It is a postmodern, visceral and sometimes horrific portrait of a young biker 
gang in a future megacity (Neo-Tokyo). One of its members, a troubled and mistreated 
Tetsuo, begins to manifest supernatural abilities that gradually transforms it into a 
physical and moral sense. In the scene that the video parodies, his best friend, Kaneda, 
tries to stop him while he looks helplessly at his transformation into a huge, monstrous 
monster. Here, the subversive pleasure so characteristic of fandom derives from the 
intertextual use of the characters of Fujio, who are usually considered as paradigm of 
Japanese traditional values and family in a transgressive context still easily 
recognizable by fan audiences. 
 
This example illustrates the contradiction inherent in Cool Japan strategies. On the 
one hand, national branding uses popular narratives in the domestic and international 
spheres. In the Olympic context, the characters derived from shōnen. This seems a 
logical choice because it is at the same time the most popular genre and contains some 
themes (martial arts, sports, adventures ...) that can be related semantically and 
emotionally with the Olympic competition. However, local and international 
audiences include a more participatory sector that, while a consumer of mainstream 
products, also chooses and develops its own stories. Perhaps that is why Ian Coundry 
referred to the movement as 'Geek Japan' (Condry, 2013), even though the strategy of 




But, whatever the messages and narratives involved in Tokyo 2020, it seems clear that 
the way in which they will be enjoyed will be very different from previous Olympic 
events. The main reason lies behind the technological and social changes promoted by 
the media convergence. Due to the large part of the millennial audience (30%), a large 
participation is expected through social media and mobile app (Bunch, 2016). 
Everything indicates that Japan will also make a great effort to be at the forefront of 
new technologies and show their technological rank. The maturity of AR / VR media 
and the increased quality of video and 360 video capture technology will allow the 
multiplication of different experiences available to audiences around the world. It is a 
matter of time that the maturity of these media allow not only the proliferation of 
canonical cultural products but also fandoms contestations. In that sense, it seems 





As a conclusion, it is difficult to discard fictional production when we talk about 
transmedia phenomena in Japanese audiences or in the production about the national 
branding of Japan. But some forms of fictionality also has space in these speeches. 
Japan takes advantage of the emotional value and the natural attraction of the 
characters of its media industries for the promotion of the event and the country itself. 
On the other hand, it is to be hoped that in the face of the multiplication of channels 
across platforms and the saturation of messages that will arrive in the next years on 
Tokyo 2020, the global audiences will produce a greater number of transmedia 
products, either between the general audiences or within the sector of a more engaged 
fan audience. The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, involves the adaptation of a set of 
political narratives to journalistic media discourses and institutional communication. 
The current Japanese National Branding is determined by the tragic events of the 2011 
earthquake and a decade of unstable strategies based on the soft power of their media 
industries. Tokyo 2020 connects both images of Japan, rescuing positive values such 
as tolerance for diversity, respect for traditions and technological innovation.  
 
Through the study of Japanese media and its global cultural exportations, I 
strengthened the idea that transmedia is inherently narrative and that in narrative 
constructions fictionality will be the common rule. In some cases, the use of the 
fictional does not imply a change in the purpose of the communication (i.e. Shizo Abe's 
cosplay as Super Mario is still a public act) so, we cannot talk about fictional genres. Is 
it, therefore, a fiction? A non-fiction? Or even a 'transfiction' insofar as it combines 
nested fictions into non-fictional transmedia structures? It is a fact that Japan is a 
country with enormous potential for story creation through its cultural production but, 
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